The present article concerns the way temporal information is represented in memory and the processes used in estimating when events occurred. In particular, we examine the sources of bias in reports of the time that has elapsed since a target event occurred. We find that reported times are less than actual times. Evidence is presented that this forward bias is not a result of misrepresentation of elapsed time in memory, but rather reflects two factors that arise in constructing reports from inexact information in memory. One factor is subjects' imposition of an upper boundary on reports, reflecting their notion of what would constitute reasonable answers to the question asked. This boundary truncates the distribution of reports, producing forward bias. The other factor is subjects' use of rounded (prototypic) values; these values, although stated in days, actually represent larger temporal categories (e.g., 14, 21, 30, 60 days ago). The distance between rounded values increases as the temporal categories become larger. Because of decreasing precision in memory and this increase in the distance between rounded values, a broader range of values is rounded down than up, thus producing forward bias.
The present article is concerned with the way temporal information is represented in autobiographical (episodic) memory and with the processes used in estimating when events occurred. It seems clear that the order of events and the intervals between them are preserved in memory, at least to some extent. Yet a systematic bias is found in people's temporal reports; there is a tendency to report events as occurring more recently than they actually occurred (Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Prohaska, 1988; Loftus & Marburger, 1983; Neter & Waksberg, 1964; Sudman & Bradburn, 1973) . At first glance, these findings suggest a lack of correspondence between time as subjectively experienced and time as objectively reckoned by the calendar. When the mental representation of a dimension fails to correspond to objectively measured distances along that dimension, it is appropriate to construct a psychological distance model (Shepard, 1974) . However, reports from memory depend both on what has been encoded and on an estimation process that produces reports from what has been encoded. Thus a bias in reporting need not reflect a bias in the memory representation. Indeed, Huttenlocher et al. (1988) proposed that the metric properties of objectively measured time are preserved in memory, although inexactly. They argued that bias arises in the construction of temporal reports-specifically, that bias arises in hierarchically organized ordered domains when an exact report
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Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Janellen Huttenlocher, University of Chicago, 5835 Kimbark Avenue. Chicago, Illinois 60637. must be made, but memory (although unbiased) is less exact than that required. Below, we examine the possible sources of bias in reporting. First, we examine the possibility of bias in memory itself, considering how alternative forms of temporal representation might give rise to distortion of objective time. Next, we examine how bias might arise in the reporting (estimation) process even if memory, while inexact, is unbiased. Huttenlocher et al. (1988) examined one source of bias in estimation (bounding effects); in the present article we consider an extension of the same principle. Also in the present article, we examine a second source of bias in estimation (rounding effects) that arises in reports of elapsed time. Finally, we present data showing forward bias in reporting in a situation different from that studied in Huttenlocher et al. (1988) , and we show that the proposed estimation processes fully account for the observed bias.
Representation of Temporal Information
It seems clear that the representation of temporal information in memory involves the conventional temporal units (days, weeks, months, and years) used to measure time. However, there is more than one possible form in which the information might be represented. Two alternative forms of representation have been discussed in the existing literaturecalendar representations and event sequence representations. Both make use of the conventional temporal units, but in different ways. Perhaps the most obvious hypothesis is that temporal memory is based on the calendar; that is, the dates of events are encoded in memory. In fact, researchers who examine the accuracy with which dates can be retrieved simply assume such a representation. However, an alternative hypothesis has recurred in the literature. In a recent discussion, Barsalou (1988) suggested that "extended event lines" are the "primary organizers" of autobiographical memory, 196 and similar views have been expressed by Kolodner (1978) , Linton (1986) , and Neisser (1986) , among others. However, there has not yet been a systematic examination of the critical differences between calendar and event sequence representations, notably, of whether distortions of objective time might be expected with one but not the other form of representation.
Within each of these possible forms of representing temporal information, we also differentiate between single-and multilevel representation. In a single-level representation, the information specified in temporal units of varying fineness of grain (day, month, year) is integrated so as to form a time line. In such a representation, the preservation of values at one level of detail (e.g., the day) implies preservation at all higher levels (e.g., the month); if information involving finely grained units is sufficiently inexact, that involving more coarsely grained units also is lost. In contrast, in a multilevel representation, the temporal information specified in temporal units of varying fineness of grain is preserved separately in memory. Strict separation among levels implies that inexactness of information at one level does not affect inexactness at other levels. We differentiate among these ways of representing temporal information, as indicated below.
Forms of Representation
A calendar representation consists of an outside framework independent of events, constructed out of the conventional units for measuring time. In our Western calendar, time is measured continuously in relation to an established zero point (at the time of Christ) by numbering the years. Smaller divisions of time-within the year-involve the use of cyclic units (days, weeks, months). These units are independent (nonredundant) so that the units at one level contain the full set of distinguishable units at a lower level. The cyclic units can preserve order and interval across time periods up to (but not longer than) the length of the cycle specified. Thus the use of cyclic units alone (the day or month in which an event occurred) cannot preserve the continuity of events in autobiographical memory. In a calendar representation, it is essential to specify the year. A calendar representation provides a framework, extending into the future, into which incoming events can be entered. The time of each event is conceptualized independently of other events. A calendar might form a single-level representation. That is, events might form a time line in which each event is related to a date (e.g., Wednesday, the 5th of July, 1989) , as in an appointment book. Alternatively, calendar units might form a multilevel representation. That is, because the calendar units at different levels of detail are defined independently, the time of an event might be specified by separate values at each; for example, the fact that an event occurred on a Wednesday and in July and in 1989 might constitute three separate pieces of information. These separate pieces of information might be retrieved and combined to produce an estimate of when an event occurred.
An event sequence representation consists of an ordered set of events separated by particular intervals of time (a day, a week, etc.). This form of representation does not involve a temporal framework independent of events; events are encoded in relation to preceding events. This temporal structure is continually being constructed by relating incoming events to earlier events. Thus the times of events are not conceptualized independently of one another. Further, there is no established zero point in an event sequence; yet a natural (but everchanging) zero point would be at the present, the point where new events are added. An event sequence might form a single-level representation. That is, events might form a time line that specifies the times between adjacent events (plus the durations of the events themselves). Events might be grouped into larger aggregate units, but the aggregates would simply be made up of component events with no independent temporal meaning. The intervals between events might be described in terms of days, weeks, and so on, but these would simply be different units for measuring the intervals. Alternatively, however, event sequences might form a multilevel representation in which each incoming event is encoded in relation to more than one earlier event (e.g., John's wedding is coded as a week after Sue's birthday, and as a month after Christmas). These relations to earlier events might be separately represented in memory. In this case, several sources of temporal information about a target event might be retrieved and combined in estimating when that event occurred.
Loss of Temporal Information Over Time
If temporal memory is exact, it constitutes a simple metric representation in which objective time is preserved without distortion. This is true regardless of whether the representation involves the calendar or an event sequence or of whether it is single-or multilevel. However, temporal memory becomes increasingly inexact over time (Baddeley, Lewis, & NimmoSmith, 1978) . Examination of the pattern of loss over time can provide evidence concerning the underlying form of the representation.
First, consider calendar representation, in which each event is coded by date, independent of other events, so that memory for the time of a target event is unaffected by the loss of information about other events. In a calendar representation, there is no obvious reason to expect systematic overall distortion to arise in the memory representation itself (leading to forward bias in reporting). In fact, in a single-level calendar representation in which preservation of information at one level (e.g., days, months) implies preservation at all other levels, there is no reason to expect any distortion at all in the memory representation. That is, even when temporal information is inexact, the mean value of reports for a particular event should lie at its true value.
In multilevel calendar representation, as in single-level calendar representation, objective time should be preserved overall in memory. However, when memory is inexact, certain forms of bias in reporting will arise because information loss occurs independently at different levels (we will call this local bias). On the one hand, a larger unit may be forgotten while values at a level of greater detail are retained; for example, people might forget the week an event occurred but remember the day; this would lead to a multimodal distribution of reports around points separated by 7 days. Indeed, Friedman and Wilkins (1985) found that the larger time period in which an event occurred may be forgotten while values at a level of greater detail are retained. Alternatively, a larger unit may be retained when values at a level of greater detail are inexact, constraining the range of possible values reported. Indeed, Huttenlocher et al. (1988) found that larger units (academic quarters, which are intervals bounded at particular dates) constrained the assignment of particular dates to school-related events. Thus both Friedman and Wilkins and Huttenlocher et al. show that there is multilevel coding of certain calendar values in memory. However, because the multilevel coding involved only cyclic units, the findings do not indicate whether the continuity of events in autobiographical memory is preserved in a calendar representation or an event sequence.
Second, consider event sequence representation. In contrast to calendar representation, it is clearly possible that systematic distortion of objective time might arise in event sequence representation. As time elapses, some events will be forgotten. If the representation of the time an event occurred is based on the sums of the intervals between events plus their durations, such loss would result in forward misplacement of those events retained in memory. Thus the forward bias observed in temporal reports might reflect a misrepresentation in memory. Both single-and multilevel representation based on event sequences could give rise to distortion over time for this same reason. Although multiple entries might affect the overall pattern of loss from memory, it is not completely clear how.
Below we consider the processes involved in answering questions about when events occurred. The nature of these processes depends on whether representation involves the calendar or event sequences. Representation based on the calendar consists of an entry of the date for each event, independent of other events. Hence, a date can be "looked up" (although for multilevel calendar representation, values at different levels are looked up separately and combined to produce a report). Representation based on an event sequence, in contrast, consists of an ordered set of events (including interval information). This form of representation does not directly yield answers to temporal questions (regardless of the form of the question). Answers must be constructed at the time of retrieval by examining the relevant portion of the event sequence (typically between the present and a target event) and by measuring that interval (number of days, weeks, etc. separating them). Note that if there is misrepresentation in temporal memory itself, bias will appear regardless of the question a person is asked. In contrast, if bias is due to processes that arise in producing reports, it should vary with the question. Below we show the patterns of bias to be expected for particular questions.
Answering Temporal Questions
We examine two sorts of variation in temporal questions. The first variation is whether questions ask for the date of an event or for how long ago an event occurred. The difficulty of the question interacts with the form of the representation. Date questions should be easiest with calendar representation and most difficult with event sequence representation, whereas elapsed time questions should be intermediate in difficulty for both calendar and event sequence.
Consider first questions about the dates of events. For calendar representation, as noted above, answers can be looked up. However, for event sequence representation, answers must be calculated. Two steps are involved. The first step is to measure the interval between the present and the target event (the size of units used [days, weeks, months] may depend on the length of the sequence and/or on the precision of the representation). The second step is to use this interval information, together with the present date, to calculate the date of the target event, as requested in the question. Consider next questions about elapsed time. The answers cannot be looked up, regardless of the form of representation (event sequence or calendar). This is so because elapsed time is not stored information, but continually changes; hence, the interval between the present and a target event must be calculated. One step is involved for each type of representation. For calendar representation, the target date is looked up, and the elapsed time is calculated; that is, it is the interval between the target date and the present date. For event sequence representation, the interval must be measured (as noted above); the interval information is in the proper form to answer an elapsed time question. Elapsed time questions may specify particular units (days, weeks, months ago). When these temporal units are more precise than the information in memory, bias in reporting may arise as indicated below under Rounding.
The second variation in temporal questions concerns what information is supplied (which determines how memory is accessed) and what information is requested (which determines what must be retrieved, inferred, or estimated). It is possible either to supply a time and ask for an event, or to supply an event and ask for a time. There are differences between the ways these two types of questions are formulated, and these no doubt reflect the asymmetry between the representation of events and the times of their occurrence. That is, although a particular event is often associated with a time, a particular time is not often associated with an event. Questions that supply an event and ask for a time generally specify a particular event (e.g., "When was John's marriage?"); they may or may not request an exact time ("How many days ago was John's marriage?"). We will call these event questions. In contrast, questions that supply a time do not generally specify an exact time or a particular event; questions like "What happened on July 9(13 days ago)?" tend to occur only in cases where it can be assumed the subject knows a great deal about an event and its date (e.g., a particular crime in a court of law). More generally, such questions specify a period of time and request instances of a particular type (e.g., "Since July 1 [in the last 6 weeks], when did you go to the doctor?"). These questions are frequently used in survey research and have been called reference period questions. Reference period questions set an upper bound on reports (e.g., only reports after July 1 are wanted); this necessarily leads to forward bias in reporting when memory is inexact, as indicated below under Bounding.
Estimation Processes
We consider two estimation processes that may give rise to bias in answering the event questions in the present article.
The first is that subjects may impose an upper bound on their reports. Huttenlocher et al. (1988) showed that when memory is inexact, bias necessarily arises for reference period questions in which the investigator sets an upper bound on reports (events since January 1, since Christmas, etc.). Parallel bias may arise if subjects themselves impose an upper bound on their reports. The other source of bias in estimation is the use of rounded values in reporting. This source of bias arises only in reports of elapsed time. These two estimation processes are described in the following two sections.
Bounding: Largest Values
Earlier studies involving reference period questions showed forward bias in reporting (e.g., Neter & Waksberg, 1964; Sudman & Bradburn, 1973) . Huttenlocher et al. (1988) pointed out that when memory is inexact, forward bias will necessarily arise in answering such questions. To see the reason, consider an event which actually occurred near the start of the reference period and for which inexactness in memory may project a value prior to the start point. If an event is projected to have occurred prior to the start point, subjects will not report it, because the question concerns events remembered as occurring within the reference period. Thus, if the distribution of remembered times for that event has a mean at the true time, the truncation due to failure to report will move the mean of the resulting distribution forward from the true time. Because the reference period ends at the present, events cannot be projected forward out of the period (into the future) but can only pile up near the end point; in any case, memory is most exact near the present so backward displacement would be small compared with forward displacement earlier in the period (See Huttenlocher et al., 1988 , for a detailed account of this process.)
Even if an upper bound is not imposed by the investigator, subjects may impose such a bound on their reports. If subjects bound their reports, it leads to truncation of the distribution of reports, just as when bounds are imposed in the question, and to forward bias in reporting. There are a variety of reasons why subjects might bound their reports. One factor is the nature of the target event about which they are asked; if the event is a relatively trivial one, they would expect to be asked about it only over some limited time period. A second factor is the way the question is phrased; a question about elapsed days would be expected only across a limited time period. It would be assumed that questions about earlier events would have been phrased in terms of weeks, months, or years.
Rounding: Prototypic Values
Answers to questions about elapsed time may be framed in terms of units of various sizes (days, weeks, or months). In fact, there are conventional forms of framing answers using units at one level (e.g., number of days) that correspond to larger temporal categories (e.g., months). For example, if a person says "30 days ago" or "60 days ago," the answer may not be meant to reflect precision to the nearest day; rather, "30 days" may be a value reported in days but used to stand for "a month." A set of reports of elapsed time framed in terms of days may include both days (raw values) and estimates in larger units stated in terms of days (i.e., rounded values).
The rounded values we have described are particular values within a category which "stand for" or represent larger categories. There has been discussion in the literature on categorization of the use of a particular instance, a "prototype," to stand for a category (cf. Oden, 1987; Posner & Keele, 1968; Smith & Medin, 1981) . As in the present case, the use of prototypes is posited to occur when memory is inexact. The evidence that people generate prototypes comes from studies in which subjects acquire categories from a set of instances and consists of a greater tendency to "recognize" prototypical instances (i.e., subjects believe they have seen prototypical instances previously even if they have not) than other instances and of better categorization of prototypes than other instances. A proposed alternative to the view that subjects generate a prototype which stands for a category is that subjects store the individual instances and that the observed differences in response to "prototypic" instances reflect the greater similarity of these instances to the entire set of instances (cf. Medin & Schaffer, 1978) . In the present case, the particular rounded values used in answering questions are prototypes. That is, they are cultural conventions acquired as values for describing larger categories. Further, the use of these prototypic values has interesting behavioral consequences-namely, the forward bias in reporting described below.
Rounded (prototypic) values, we posit, are used when the temporal information in memory in inexact. Inexactness of temporal information increases over time (Baddeley et al., 1978) . Thus, over time, two changes should be found in the use of rounded (prototypic) values. First, there should be an increase in the proportion of prototypic values relative to raw values over time. Second, the size of the temporal units used in rounding (e.g., weeks vs. months) should become larger over time. There are two likely sources of the rounded or prototypic values used in reporting. First, there are values based on intervals of calendar time, namely, weeks (multiples of 7) or months (multiples of 30). Second, there are values based on the decimal system used generally in numerical estimation-roundings by 5s, 10s, and so forth.
If the size of the reporting interval (the distance between adjacent rounded values) increases with the amount of elapsed time and if reports are framed in terms of days, the distance between prototypic values in days used in reporting also will increase over time. In this case, forward bias in reporting will arise even if people's reports are generated from an underlying distribution with inexactness distributed symmetrically around the true elapsed time. To see the reason, consider the prototypic values 7, 10, 14, 21, 30, and 60 days. We make the argument about bias for a hypothetical case in which subjects choose the prototypic values nearest to their recollection. That is, the reporting interval for each prototypic value is bounded by the midpoints between adjacent rounded values. Assignment of the rounded response 14 begins at remembered values of 12 (midway between 10 and 14) and ends at remembered values of 17.5 (midway between 14 and 21). Note that the distance between 12 and 14 is smaller than that between Hand 17.5. Because the range of remembered values to which a particular rounded value is assigned is smaller in a forward than in a backward direction, a smaller range of values is rounded up (e.g., to 14) than rounded down, and this produces a net forward bias in reporting. By the same argument, forward bias due to rounding in terms of the decimal system also might appear with increases in elapsed time if people first round by 5s, then by 10s, and so on.
Modeling of Bounding and Rounding Processes
Our purpose in the present study is to evaluate whether bias in temporal reports reflects the misrepresentation of temporal information in memory or reflects estimation processes based on inexact but unbiased temporal information. Our approach to this problem, as in Huttenlocher et al. (1988) is to posit a model that holds that events are represented with no bias (but with uncertainty that increases over time) and that the bias arises in producing estimates. We examine whether the model can account for the observed distribution of temporal reports. The temporal reports we will be concerned with are answers to event questions. We model temporal reports in which subjects are asked how many days have elapsed since a target event. The reason for the focus on elapsed time, to anticipate our findings, is that people generally were unwilling to report the date of our target event, whereas they would report the number of days which had elapsed since that event.
The model we propose can be described in terms of three processes: a retrieval/measurement process, a bounding process, and a response process. The retrieval/measurement process corresponds to extracting an uncertain value from memory. The bounding process constrains values to lie in a bounded range consistent with the question that was asked. The response process involves translating that uncertain value into a specific value. We posit that, for reports of elapsed days, one of two related response processes may be used, commensurate with the uncertainty of the retrieved value. The first response process generates a response that directly reflects the inexact value obtained from memory (we call these raw responses). The second response process rounds that value either to a conventional calendar prototype (i.e., 7, 10,14,21,30, or 60) or to a conventional arithmetic prototype (i.e., a multiple of 5 or 10). Because uncertainty increases over time, the effects of the bounding and rounding processes will be more pronounced as the actual elapsed time increases.
The Study
Our purpose was to examine the sources of bias in answering questions as to when an event occurred. Two types of event questions were used: One type requested the date of a target event, and the other type requested the number of days which had elapsed since that target event. Our purpose in varying the type of question was to investigate the form of temporal representation in memory. Recall that date questions should be easiest with calendar representation and most difficult with event sequence representation, compared with elapsed time questions, which should be intermediate in difficulty with both forms of representation. Thus if date questions are either much easier or much more difficult than elapsed time questions, it would provide evidence concerning the form of representation. As noted above, date questions were very difficult, and we concluded that our target event was represented within an event sequence.
As we have indicated, event sequence representations (in contrast to calendar representations) might become distorted over time, leading to forward bias in reporting. Alternatively, objective time might be preserved in event sequences, and forward bias might arise because of bounding and/or rounding in estimation. The imposition of an upper bound can be detected in a set of data by the absence of reported values above a given value despite the presence of true values above that level. The use of rounding (prototypic values) can be detected in a set of data by a lack of correspondence between reported and true values in which certain values are overused relative to their true numbers. The conclusion that the overused values are prototypes representative of larger temporal units will be strengthened if the overused values reflect the rounding conventions either of the calendar system and/or the decimal system.
Our goal in designing the present study was to find a target event that would meet the following criteria. First, the event should be one which all subjects experience in essentially the same way, thus avoiding variations in salience that could potentially affect estimation. Second, the event should be one which is distributed over time, so that particular characteristics of any unique date can be avoided. Third, the event should be one which is unlikely to be embedded in a larger event cluster that could potentially complicate its temporal encoding and that might be represented differently across people. Fourth, the event should be one for which it is possible to obtain a large number of reports so that the estimation model can be assessed.
We were able to implement a design that met all these requirements. The target event was one to which a large random sample of people was exposed and which occurred at arbitrary times. Our target event was an interview of approximately 2 hr conducted in subjects' homes as part of the General Social Survey (GSS). This survey is conducted each year by a survey organization associated with the University of Chicago (NORC, originally an acronym for National Opinion Research Center). In such surveys, a follow-up telephone call (a "validation call") is made to some percentage of subjects to verify what occurred during the interviews. These calls are made at varying intervals after the interview-in the ordinary course of events, within approximately 30 days (although this was deliberately altered in our third study). The assignment of people to delay conditions is unsystematic. We designed the temporal questions used in these validation calls.
Method
Three studies were carried out over a period of 3 years. The data modeled in the article (reports of elapsed days) are combined over the three studies (see Results). We describe the methods and goals of each of the studies separately. The study in the first year was designed to examine two issues. The first was people's ability to answer questions about elapsed time versus dates. The other was to obtain preliminary data to determine whether rounding occurred for ques-tions about elapsed days. There were 112 subjects in this study; 65 were asked for the date of the interview, and 47 were asked how may days ago the interview occurred. Only 15 subjects out of the 65 asked about the date were willing to answer or even to give an educated guess; in contrast 35 subjects out of the 47 asked about elapsed days gave an answer. The answers to the elapsed time questions showed overuse of particular values consistent with the rounding hypothesis. This first study showed that, at least for the event under study, representation involves an event sequence, not a calendar representation. It also showed that more systematic examination of the effects of rounding would be worthwhile.
The study in the second year included only questions about elapsed days. We presented a stronger probe to elicit an answer to the question about elapsed days when subjects responded to the initial question by saying they did not know the answer. In this second-year study there were 149 subjects, of whom 134 answered the elapsed days question. There was considerable overuse of prototypic values. However, in order to test our model systematically, more data were needed. Especially, we wanted to obtain data over a somewhat longer time period to enable further exploration of use of prototypes.
The study in the third year extended the period over which validation calls were made from the usual 30 day period to more than 60 days. This was done to allow us to examine prototype usage over a longer time period. There were 629 subjects, 595 of whom reported days ago. We also added a general temporal question, prior to the elapsed days question, which simply asked when the interview had taken place. No probe was presented for this question. This question was included for two reasons. First, we wanted to determine if subjects tend spontaneously to answer in terms of elapsed time rather than date, and second, we wanted to determine if the size of the temporal category subjects used in reporting (weeks, months) would increase with actual elapsed time.
The data used to evaluate our model includes all the responses to the elapsed days questions over the three studies for which the true time of the home interview was available. The information about the relation between true and reported times is the critical data in fitting the model. True times serve as the basis for the examination of bias.
Procedure
In all 3 years, the validation call began with an introduction as follows:
I am calling from NORC at the University of Chicago. Recently, you were kind enough to allow one of our interviewers (name of interviewer) to interview you in connection with a study we are conducting. We always recheck some of the interviews by asking a few questions to make sure that the information we've collected is accurate, and we also ask a few follow-up questions.
In all three studies, three different temporal questions were asked. The one analyzed in this article was "How many days ago did the interview take place?" (This question preceded the other two questions that concerned the day of the week and the hour of the day of the interview.) If subjects said they did not know how many days ago the interview took place, they were asked to "Please make your best guess about the number of days." In the third year, an extra question was included after the introduction and before the specific question about elapsed days. Subjects were simply asked "When did the interview take place?"
Subjects
The total number of subjects for whom reported days ago (and actual days ago) is available is 764 across the three studies. These subjects were drawn from a larger sample group who had been interviewed earlier in their homes. The home interview is the GSS conducted each year by NORC, associated with the University of Chicago. The sampling frame for the GSS is based on the 1980 census. The sample for the GSS is a probability sample of residents aged 18 and older in households in the continental United States. Subjects for the validation call were a random sample of people interviewed, stratified by interviewer and length of time since the original interview. This smaller sample was contacted by telephone. Of the total group included here, 629, contacted in the third year, were asked the general first question.
Results

Spontaneous Choice of Temporal Categories
First, let us consider the distribution of answers to the general question as to when the event occurred. The answers are shown in Table 1 . Of the 629 persons presented with this question, 104 said they could not remember and gave no answer. Of the remainder, 72% of the responses were given in terms of elapsed time. The next largest category, 10% of responses, simply stated the day of the week on which the interview was remembered to have occurred. Only 4% of subjects produced an exact date (e.g., February 4).
Let us consider the answers stated in terms of elapsed time. There are differences in the reporting units used, and these are related to the actual elapsed time since the home interview. Reports in weeks and in months are the predominant modes of responding. The proportion of reports in terms of weeks decreases over time, while the proportion of reports in terms of months increases. Reports in months are rare until 5 weeks have elapsed, after which they rise rapidly relative to reports in weeks. We will return to these data below because they have implications for the use of particular prototypic values in reports of the number of elapsed days since the home interview. For example, the elapsed time since an interview that actually occurred 43 days ago may be remembered by some subjects in terms of weeks (6 weeks) and by other subjects in terms of months (a month and a half)-One might expect differences between the subjects in the use of 42 versus 45 days ago when they report the elapsed time in days.
Reports of Elapsed Days
Now we turn to the reports of number of elapsed days. Figure 1 shows reported elapsed days against actual elapsed days for all subjects. Reports below the diagonal line indicate values that are smaller than actual elapsed time (forward bias), and reports above the diagonal line indicate values that are larger than actual elapsed time (backward bias). Several features of the figure should be noted. First, more reports lie below than above the line, indicating forward bias, except for the upper right-hand portion of the graph where we approach the maximum actual elapsed time. In that portion of the graph the full range of actual days which would have been associated with various reports cannot be examined because there are few actual times that might potentially have been moved forward. One feature of the data is the virtual absence of reports greater than 60 days. There are only 3 values greater than 60. Indeed, there are 37 cases where the true number of elapsed days is greater than 60 days; none of these were reported as occurring more than 60 days ago. Thus it appears that there is an aspect of the reporting process (i.e., an imposed upper bound) which constrains reports to fall at the prototypic value of 60 days or less.
A second feature of the data is the uneven distribution of reports over the range of possible days. This uneven distribution constitutes evidence of use of prototypic values in reporting. Our choice of calendar prototypes was determined by recognized cultural usage; we chose 7, 10, 14, 21, 30, and 60 days as calendar prototypes. We distinguish these prototypes from multiples of 5 while recognizing that some of them (10, 30, 60) are numerically multiple of 5. We do so because 30 and 60 days are well recognized synonyms for 1 or 2 months, and 10 days is a frequent synonym for a week and a half. It should be noted that the prototypes may reflect some intrusion of the decimal system into the calendar system in that the modal month actually is 31 days, and a week-and-ahalf is 10.5 days. These particular numbers are much more frequently used in connection with elapsed time than are other multiples of 5.
Our selection of prototypes is validated by the observed distribution of reports. Although these six values chosen as prototypes constitute less than 10% of the values falling in the total range of reports, they make up 70% of the reports. Five of these values are the five most frequent responses (the only values with over 40 reports). The remaining prototype (7 days) is of obvious importance in the calendar, even though the frequency of reporting at 7 days is somewhat lower than the other prototypes; the lower frequency of reports at 7 days is to be expected because memory for recent dates is more accurate, and consequently people make less frequent use of prototypes in the recent past.
The unevenness of the distribution of reports is seen in Figure 1 by examining the prominence of horizontal lines at certain values. A bar graph of reported elapsed days is shown in Figure 2 . The great frequency of responses involving calendar prototypes can be noted. Roundings by fives are overused to some extent. Rounding to 45 is overused relative to other roundings by 5s, as might be expected if it is used to stand for a month and a half. It also can be noted that 28 and 42 are to some extent overused. These values are roundings to 4 and 6 weeks, respectively. As we saw above in examining the data on the general time question, when the actual elapsed time was in the range of 4-6 weeks, the reports of some Figure J . A tabulation of reports of elapsed days for each actual number of elapsed days. z c subjects were described in terms of weeks, and of other subjects in terms of months. In short, the shift from weeks to months does not occur at just one point in time. The shift from weeks to months could be conceived in terms of a rate function describing the probability that either weeks or months would be used. The rate function for weeks probably decreases smoothly over time while that for months increases in a corresponding fashion. Although rate function could have been explicitly modeled, in this article we chose to use a simpler model of a sudden shift from weeks to months. The use of this simpler model has the predictable effect of more poorly modeling responses over the range where both weeks and months are used in rounding, as we will see below.
NUMBER OF REPORTS FOR EACH ACTUAL DAY
Recall that we posit that subjects use two response processes yielding three varieties of responses: raw responses (reflecting values subject to bounding but otherwise reported as retrieved from memory), calendar prototypes, and arithmetic prototypes. Let us now examine the proportion of each of these three types of responses as actual elapsed time increases. Figures 3,4 , and 5 show the observed proportions of responses of each of the three types for each actual number of days ago, together with the curve fit by the model(as discussed below). Figure 3 shows the proportion of raw responses as a function of the number of actual elapsed days. It should be noted that the proportion of such responses drops over time and ultimately approaches zero. The points are fit by an exponential curve. Figure 4 shows the proportion of calendar prototypes as a function of the number of elapsed days. It should be noted that the proportion of such responses rises over time. These points are fit by a straight line. Figure 5 shows the proportion of responses which are multiples of 5 and which are not calendar prototypes. These responses are best fit by a curve that rises at first and declines more slowly over time.
Note that the criterion for fitting these curves is the adequacy of reproduction of the pattern of responses, not fit to the proportions of response types. More complex functional forms might well improve fit of the curves to the proportions but would increase the complexity of the estimation process. Figure 6 shows the standard deviation of reports for each actual number of days ago. For many of these days, the number of reports is small, and consequently the standard deviations are necessarily variable. In spite of this, there is a general increasing trend in the standard deviations over time. The model described below posits a standard deviation associated with an underlying uncertainty in information retrieved from memory. Following earlier research (Baddeley et al., 1978; Huttenlocher et al., 1988) , we assume that, in the absence of factors arising in estimation, this underlying standard deviation increases linearly with elapsed time. The observed standard deviation, however, is complicated by the mixing together of the rounding and bounding processes described above. First, the bounding process, which folds back values above 60, decreases the observed standard deviation, especially for events that occur near the boundary, (in comparison with the underlying standard deviation if no such boundary existed). Second, the rounding process, which is equivalent to grouping together a range of values, acts to decrease the standard deviation of observed values compared with the underlying standard deviation at points near the prototypic values and increases the standard deviation of observed values at points far from the prototypic values. Third, this pattern due to rounding itself changes over time because the proportion of rounded values increases as elapsed time increases. Thus, even given an underlying linear increase over time in standard deviation of information retrieved from memory, the relation between the observed standard deviation and actual elapsed time is a complex one. The pattern of predicted values of the standard deviation over time shown in Figure 6 is described in the model below. Figure 7 shows the extent of the bias in reporting elapsed days; the data are a composite showing overall bias across all three response types. The horizontal axis shows actual elapsed days. The vertical axis shows bias in terms of reported minus actual values. Hence, zero shows accurate reporting, negative values show forward bias, and positive values show backward bias. Figure 7 also shows a curve indicating the overall expected bias predicted by our model (as discussed below). It shows that a net forward projection can be seen by approximately Day 28; the bias increases as actual elapsed time increases. The overall bias data is broken down for each type of response in Figures 8, 9 , and 10; bias for each type of response is shown over time together, with the curve indicating the bias predicted by the model (as discussed below). Figure 8 shows the bias for raw responses. It can be seen that bias begins to emerge at approximately 45 days as a result of the truncation of the distribution of reports due to the imposed upper boundary. It should be noted that the responses which are not calendar prototypes might be compromises affected by prototypes. In that case, however, bias would be seen across the same range as for the calendar prototypes, but this is not the case. Figure 9 shows the bias for roundings of 5. Here there is a small fixed bias until approximately 45 days where the effects of the imposed boundary can be seen. The small fixed bias reflects the fact that the interval in which each rounded value is reported is not symmetric about rounded values (see below). Figure 10 shows bias for reports involving calendar prototypes. Here one sees not only a boundary effect but also a pattern of increasing forward bias across a large portion of the graph because of the use of prototypic values. Analyses of variance for the difference in amount of bias over all days for the three types of responses show significant differences, F -6.94, p < .01, and post hoc tests show that each pair of means is different (p < .05).
Evaluating the Model
The model we propose to account for the observed bias in reporting was described informally in the introductory section of the article and is described in more detail below. (The mathematical formulation is presented in the Appendix.) The model posits that the process of measuring the appropriate portion of the event sequence yields a value, denoted X, which is sampled from a normal distribution with a mean at the true elapsed time and a standard deviation that depends on the true elapsed time. The other components of the model have to do with response generation processes in which that information is used to construct a report. There are two aspects to report construction. One concerns the upper boundary, and the other concerns rounding. We start with the upper boundary because, we posit, it precedes the assignment of prototypic values.
We posit that this X value comes from a distribution whose mean is at the true number of elapsed days. However, it is not the raw X values which provide the basis for generating reports, but rather the truncated values which are the output of a process which imposes an upper bound. We denote the output of this bounding process as the variable Y. Because the variance of X is large for actual days approaching 60, the full distribution of X around those actual days would extend far above (as well as below) 60. Further, there are 37 values for which the true elapsed time is greater than 60 days. The imposition of a boundary at 60 days results in a Y distribution that is a severely truncated version of the X distribution. Because this truncation process eliminates large values by replacing them with smaller values, the mean of the truncated Y distribution is smaller than the mean of the X distribution, which is the true elapsed time; that is, the truncation results in a forward bias.
The second aspect of the response generation process maps the truncated distribution of X values (Y values) onto reports of elapsed days. We posit two response processes. The first involves simply reporting a value from the truncated distribution. The other process involves use of prototypic values: rounding to multiples of 5 or 10 or rounding to one of the calendar prototypes. When values from the Y distribution are mapped onto prototypic values, the model posits, a value that falls into a particular interval is assigned a particular prototypic value. We do not predefine the cut point between intervals but rather estimate the best cut point from the data. Specifically, we incorporate a parameter c, which is the ratio of the distance from the cut point to the previous prototype relative to the distance between the two adjacent prototypes. To describe the cut point c used in the rounding process, it is helpful to denote the prototypes as r,, r 2 , r 3 , The distance between prototype / and the preceding prototype is therefore (r, -r,_,), and the corresponding distance to the next prototype is therefore (r,+i -r t ). The rounding process involves assigning a particular prototype value r, whenever the Y value is between r,_i + c(n -r;_i) and r, + c(r,+i -r t ). Thus the parameter c reflects the location of the end of the interval associated with a prototype. For example, the value c = .5 reflects rounding to the prototype nearest to Y while the value c = 1.0 reflects rounding the greatest prototype that is less than or equal to Y. Preliminary explorations, assuming no uncertainty (i.e., where elapsed time is perfectly preserved in memory) suggested that c is approximately .70. It should be noted that because each subject gives only a single response, we cannot estimate a cut point separately for each individual. It might be that all individuals use a cut point in this range. Alternatively, some individuals may use the halfway mark as the cut point, and other individuals may use the prototype value itself as the cut point.
The model posits that individuals may use either of these two response-generating mechanisms. However, as we have already seen in Figures 8-10 , the proportion of individuals using any one of these mechanisms (the so-called mixing probability) is determined by the actual elapsed time. For example, raw values (and hence the response process generating them) are more probable near the present, and calendar prototypes are more probable in the more distant past.
The model (described formally in the Appendix) implies that the distribution of responses is a function of three factors: (a) the normal distribution of the X values (in particular the standard deviation a reflecting the uncertainty in X); (b) the nature of response processes including the parameter c reflecting the location of the intervals associated with each prototype; (c) the probability that each response process is used (in particular the four parameters determining the mixing probabilities).
The observed frequency of reports for each elapsed number of days can be used to estimate the parameters of the model by using the method of maximum likelihood. This involves (in principle) choosing as estimates the values of the parameters that most closely reproduce the distribution of observed reports. Each of the three factors modeled might, potentially, involve a large number of parameters, but empirical regularities in the data (or earlier data) allowed us to greatly reduce the number of parameters used in the model. First, we assumed that the underlying standard deviation of observed reports increases linearly with elapsed time, consistent with earlier findings on reports of dates (Huttenlocher et ah, 1988) . Thus, instead of estimating a independently for each day, resulting in 70 parameters, we estimated the coefficients of a linear relation between a and elapsed time by using just 2 parameters, namely, the slope and the intercept of the linear relation. Second, the mixing proportions might be different for each actual day, resulting in 2 x 70 = 140 parameters. However, the proportion of prototypical reports increased linearly, and raw responses decreased exponentially with elapsed time. (The proportion of multiples of 5 is determined by the proportions of raw responses and prototypes.) Hence, we estimated the coefficients of an exponential (for raw responses) and a linear relation (for prototypical responses) between elapsed time and the probability of each type of response; this resulted in a total of four parameters (two for the exponential and two for the linear relationship) for the mixing proportions. Third, the cutting point c might be different for each prototypic value, resulting in 15 parameters (one for each of the six prototypes plus 9 for each of the nonprototype multiples of 5). However, the c values estimated independently for each prototype and multiple of 5 were quite similar in value. Hence, we constrained the c values for all 15 distinct prototypic values to be the same and obtained one parameter.
Our empirical modeling strategy is not an attempt to optimally account for every feature of the data so as to achieve the best fit possible, with the attendant price of increasing complexity. Instead, we examine a relatively simple model whose general features are derived from theoretical as opposed to empirical considerations. We explore the degree to which this model is consistent with the data we have collected, and we explore the discrepancies between the predictions of the model and the data.
The observed data were used to estimate simultaneously the seven parameters of the model via the method of maximum likelihood. The first concern in evaluating the model is whether it accurately reproduces the distribution of the observed data (the number of reports of each number of elapsed days, for each actual number of elapsed days). If it reproduces the entire distribution of responses, it must, of course, account for bias and other specific features of the data distribution. The degree to which the model reproduces the distribution of observed data is assessed by means of two fit statistics: the likelihood ratio chi-square statistic (G 2 ) and the Pearsonian chi-square square statistic (X 1 ). These two statistics are analogous to those used in the log-linear analysis of contingency tables and give similar but not identical results (see the Appendix). After estimating the values of the seven model parameters by using the method of maximum likelihood, we found that the values of the fit statistics were G 2 = 192.3 and X 2 = 139.5. Both of these values are statistically significant at the p < .02 level, indicating that the distribution of responses predicted by the model departed from that observed in the data.
To examine where the model fails to fit, examine Table 2 , which provides the actual (observed) number of each elapsed number of days, the number of responses predicted (expected) by the model, and the contribution of that response to the Pearsonian chi-square statistic. It is clear from Table 2 that the three largest contributions to the misfit are the larger than expected number of responses on Days 28, 42, and 45. Recall that we expected that these values might misfit because of our choice of an unrealistically simple transition from the use of weeks to months at a single point. This misfitting seems to suggest that the use of weeks persists to the point of 4 and 6 weeks (28 and 42 days) and perhaps that a "month and half serves as a kind of prototype so that some people use 6 weeks and 45 days to indicate this prototype. The values of the fit statistics computed for all responses except 28, 42, or 45 days were G 2 = 27.6 and X 2 = ll.l. These values are not statistically significant. Comparing these values with their null sampling distributions (i.e., the distribution of the fit statistics omitting responses of 28, 42, and 45 days but assuming perfect fit elsewhere), we see that values of X 1 as large as X 2 = 13 J would occur due to chance between 15% and 20% of the time, and values as large as G 2 = 27.6 would occur over 80% of the time. Hence, except for underpredicting responses of 28, 42, and 45 days, the model adequately reproduces the observed distribution of responses. Now consider the specific question of bias (the difference between the reported and actual number of elapsed days). The average observed bias overall was -3.18 days, and the average bias predicted by the model is -2.74 days or about 86% of that observed. Note that when the model is fit by ignoring the contribution of responses on Days 28, 42, and 45, the average observed bias (-6.02 days) and the bias predicted by the model (-6.01) days are almost identical. For each actual elapsed time, the difference between the average of the reports and the actual elapsed time (observed bias in reports) was computed. These values are shown in Figure 7 . The columns labeled Actual vs. reported days ago in Table 3 show / test statistics and two-tailed significance levels for each actual elapsed time. For the 63 t tests (t statistics could not be computed in 7 cases because fewer than two events occurred on those days), 25 of the comparisons (40%) between actual elapsed time and mean reports were significant at the a = .05 level of significance. Because only 5% or 3 comparisons would be expected to be significant due to chance if there is no underlying bias, it is clear that significant bias was observed on a substantial number of actual elapsed days. Controlling for the use of multiple significance tests via the Bonferroni method (see Miller, 1985) would require a p value of less than .0008 to be significant at the simultaneous significance level of .05. When we controlled for multiple tests, seven of the comparisons were still significant.
Finally, for each actual elapsed time, the difference between expected and observed bias was computed to determine whether the modeled values were close to the actual values. The columns of Table 3 labeled Modeled vs. reported days ago show t test statistics and two-tailed significance levels for each actual elapsed time. Only 3 of 63 comparisons (or 4.8%) between modeled values and mean reports were significant at the a = .05 level of significance. This proportion is almost exactly the 5% that would be expected due to chance. Thus the observed bias differed from that predicted by the model at a chance level. Controlling for multiple tests, we found that none of the comparisons between mean reports and modeled values was significant. When / values comparing modeled and reported bias are combined across actual days by using the inverse normal test of the significance of combined results (see, e.g., Hedges & Olkin, 1985) to provide an overall test of fit, the combined z statistic (z = 0.41, p = .34) was not significant.
Specific features of the model. Tests for the significance of specific parameters in the model are conducted by comparing the goodness of fit statistics of related (nested) models. This procedure is analogous to that used in the analysis of loglinear models for contingency tables, structural equation models, and other analyses based on likelihood ratio tests. To test whether a specific parameter is different from zero, the model fit statistic computed using the empirically estimated parameter is compared with the model fit statistic using zero (the null value) for the parameter value. If the model fits substantially (e.g., statistically significantly) better with the empirically estimated parameter value, that parameter value is (statistically) significant. As in the case of log-linear models for contingency tables, two fit statistics are available: the likelihood ratio chi-square (G 2 ) and the Pearsonian chi-square (X 2 ). These two fit statistics give similar but not identical results.
One feature of our model is whether the response mechanisms generating prototypes and multiples of five are necessary. To find out if the mechanism generating prototypes is necessary, we compare the fit statistics of the model including this mechanism (G 2 = 192.3 and X 2 = 139.5) with those of the best fitting models without prototypes (i.e., with the two mixing parameters for prototypes set to zero) and obtain G 2 > 1,000, X 2 > 1,000. The difference between the fit of the two models is very large and highly statistically significant (the difference in G 2 values is significant with p < .0001). Similarly, to determine whether the response mechanism generating multiples of five is necessary, we compare the fit statistics of the final model (G 2 = 192.3 and X 2 = 139.5) with those of the best fitting model without this mechanism (i.e., with the mixing parameters for 5s set to zero), G 2 = 465.4 and X 2 = 574.1. The difference again is large, and the difference in G 2 is statistically significant, with p < .0001.
Two values for the parameter c are reasonable a priori. The value c = 0.5 would correspond to rounding to the nearest prototype. The value c = 1.0 would correspond to rounding down to the preceding prototype. The fit statistics when c is estimated to be .69 are with G 2 = 518.7 and X 2 > 1,000 when c = 1.0, and G 2 = 234.9 and X 2 = 189.6 when c = .5. Hence, the estimated value of c = .69 is significantly different (p < .001) than either c = .5 or c = 1.0.
We also tested certain other features of the model parameterization. For example, we tested whether the proportion of multiples of five fit a linear curve as well as they fit an exponential curve (they did not) and whether the standard deviations might increase nonlinearly with true time of occurrence (they do not).
Discussion
We have obtained reports from people as to when a target event (a home interview) occurred. People tended to report this target event in terms of the amount of time that had elapsed since it occurred, not in terms of calendar date. The evidence is striking. First, in the initial study, half the subjects were asked about elapsed time, and the other half were asked about the date of the target event. Whereas 75% of subjects asked about elapsed time produced an answer, only 23% of the subjects asked about the date produced an answer. Second, in the final study we included a question that could be answered in terms of either elapsed time or date and by using units at any level of detail (weeks, months). Of the people who answered, 72% used elapsed time in their reports; only 4% gave an exact date.
The major focus of the studies was the relation between actual and reported numbers of elapsed days since a target event. Forward bias was found in people's reports. We proposed a model in which bias is not the result of misrepresentation of elapsed time in memory. The model posits that memory is unbiased, but increasingly inexact over time, with bias arising in the process of generating responses to the questions asked. The model posits two factors that contribute to bias in estimating elapsed days: the imposition of an upper boundary and the use of prototypic values. We found that these two factors, arising in the reporting process, fully account for the observed bias in reporting.
Consider first the imposed upper boundary on reports. The data clearly showed that 60 days was an upper boundary. Huttenlocher et al. (1988) showed that for questions in which reporting period boundaries were stated, forward bias could be explained by inexactness in memory for dates; this resulted in truncation of the distribution of reports near the boundary. The present study shows that subjects may impose boundaries not explicitly stated in the question. In our model, this bound- ary is imposed on the unbiased but inexact information retrieved from memory, which leads to forward bias.
Consider next the use of rounded values in reporting. The data show striking overuse of certain culturally established prototypic values, namely 7, 10, 14, 21, 30, and 60 days. We posited that the temporal information retrieved from memory is assigned one of three sorts of values: raw values, values rounded by 5, or calendar prototypes. Raw responses fall off with time as memory becomes less exact, and calendar prototypes increase with time for the same reason. Calendar prototypes increase in distance over time, changing from rounding in weeks (expressed in multiples of 7) to roundings in months (expressed in multiples of 30). Thus, the use of prototypic values reflects what subjects remember about elapsed time. The distance between prototypic values increases over time, so for each prototypic value the range of larger values rounded down is broader than the range of smaller values rounded up, and this leads to forward bias. The increase in distance between calendar prototypes (reflecting the units used) surely will vary for different people and for events which differ in salience. We did not model such rate variation in the increase in unit size over time.
By incorporating just two sources of forward bias (an imposed boundary and a particular set of prototypic values) into a quantitative model, we were able to account remarkably well for observed bias in reporting. That is, for each actual number of elapsed days, the predicted number of reports was very close to the actual number of reports. Only 3 days out of 60 were poorly fit (28, 42, and 45 days), and these show the effects of variation in the ways of assigning prototypic values. The overuse of 28 reflects rounding in terms of weeks or an alternative representation of a month. The overuse of 45, relative to other roundings to 5s, reflects the value for a month and a half for subjects using months as the unit, and similarly the overuse of 42 may reflect the continued use of weeks or 6 weeks for a month and a half.
Issues Concerning Mental Representation
Our findings are relevant to two issues concerning mental representation raised in the introduction. First, the findings provide evidence about the way temporal information is preserved in autobiographical memory. Second, the findings provide evidence concerning the role of temporal prototypes in which particular values are used to stand for larger categories.
Temporal representation in autobiographical memory. We have noted that although it is obvious that autobiographical memory preserves (to some extent) the order and metric continuity of events in time, there has not yet been a systematic evaluation of the form in which this information is represented. We distinguished between calendar representation, in which the time of events is preserved in terms of an outside temporal framework, and event sequence representation, in which the time of events is preserved in relation to one another. We noted that the relative difficulty of questions about date versus questions about elapsed time might provide evidence about the form of representation. Date questions should be harder than elapsed time questions with event sequence representation, but the opposite should be the case with calendar representation. Our subjects were more easily able to report the number of days that had elapsed since a target event than to report its date. This strongly suggests that the target event is represented within an event sequence. So too does the fact that subjects most frequently answered a general question as to when an event occurred in terms of elapsed time, not date.
Event sequence representation, we suggested, might lead to distortion of objective time in memory through loss from memory of events which form part of the sequence. In fact, the general pattern of reports obtained-showing increasing bias over time-is surely consistent with a pattern of increasing misrepresentation of temporal information over time. However, we found no evidence of such misrepresentation in memory. The forward bias observed could be explained fully on the basis of two factors arising in the process of producing an estimate. Subjects imposed an upper bound on their reports, and there was extensive overuse of certain values. Neither of these aspects of the data reflects misrepresentation in memory. Thus here, as in Huttenlocher et al.'s (1988) study, we conclude that objective time is preserved in memory and that there is no need for a psychological scaling of time.
So compelling is the argument that temporal representation based on event sequences should lead to a progressive shrinkage of psychological time relative to objective time that it suggests that the representation of temporal information in autobiographical memory is not based solely on event sequence representation. The view that temporal information is preserved via some combination of these two modes of representation is not a novel one. It is clear that for certain personal and public events (e.g., birthdays, presidential inaugurations), the full date is remembered. Further, it is clear that partial information about calendar values frequently is available (e.g., day of the week an event occurred). On the other hand, it also is clear that for certain events not only are the dates not directly available, but they cannot even be easily inferred. One possible interpretation is that the underlying form of temporal representation in autobiographical memory involves an event sequence and that the dates of events, like nontemporal information, are simply associated with particular events. The alternative is that not only are some dates remembered but that they form a part of an event sequence in such a way as to anchor the event sequence in relation to the calendar, thus preserving objective time overall. In this case, there might be local distortions of time. That is, while the entire period between dated events would be "stretched" to match objective time, particular events might be part of an event sequence and only indirectly linked to the calendar. This could give rise to local distortions in the temporal representation itself. Because such distortion would reflect the loss of events from memory, it should become greater as the time period from the present increases.
Temporal categories and prototypes. The particular values in terms of which subjects report elapsed time are stated at one level of detail (days) but are used to stand for larger temporal categories (weeks, months). As noted above, the use of particular values (category instances) to represent or "stand for" larger categories has been discussed in the existing literature on categorization. Posner and Keele (1968) posited that in acquiring a category (e.g., of visual forms), people may generate an "abstract idea" (a prototype) to represent that category. One sort of evidence of prototypes is a greater tendency to "recognize" prototypical instances than other instances (i.e., subjects believe they have seen such instances previously even if they have not). It has proven difficult to distinguish a model that explains these recognition data by positing prototypes from a model which posits that people simply remember instances and that their responses reflect the fact that so-called prototypic instances are the instances that are most similar, overall, to the set of stored instances (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986) .
The prototypes in the present study are not hypothesized abstractions posited to explain bias in recognition data. Rather they are responses involving particular values which are overrepresented in the data. These responses represent learned ways of expressing category information (a week, a month) by using particular values (7 days, 30 days). Thus the existence of the prototypes is not a matter of debate. We have shown certain consequences of using these prototypic values (number of days) to stand for larger units (weeks, months) in estimation. First, the overrepresentation of these values in people's reports results in local bias in the regions around each prototypic value. Second, in cases where prototypes are unevenly distributed over a dimension, as in the temporal case, an overall bias in reporting results.
Rather than being an aspect of temporal representation itself, the prototypes in the present case are forms of reporting used when memory is inexact. That is, the overuse of these prototypic values does not reflect a pile up in autobiographical memory of particular elapsed times. Elapsed times since particular events are not stored information, but rather are estimated when the situation requires. The time that has elapsed since a remembered event when such estimates are made surely does not systematically fall at the prototypes. The estimation of elapsed time may involve either measuring the interval by using a scale (a temporal ruler) made up of conventional units (e.g., days, weeks) or "adding up" intervals between adjacent events. These elapsed times are then converted to prototypic values when the level of precision of the interval is less than that required in the question (we require an answer in days). Alternatively, however, it is possible that people compare the entire interval with stored category information. That is, people could have acquired categories such as "a month ago," also known as "30 days ago," from experiences in which various intervals are labeled-for example, "Harry's birthday was a month ago." 
Conclusions
In conclusion, it should be noted that the two sources of bias in estimation modeled in the present study reflect general principles having to do with the estimation of quantity. That is, both the imposition of bounds on what constitutes a reasonable answer and the use of rounded values may be sources of bias in producing reports of quantity from inexact ' This possibility was pointed out to us by Douglas Medin. information in memory in cases other than reports of elapsed time.
The imposition of an upper boundary on reports reflects subjects' beliefs about a largest reasonable estimate. In the present case, the imposed bound reflects subjects' beliefs about the conditions under which particular questions are likely to be asked (called "felicity conditions" by those who study speech acts). That is, subjects expect that elapsed time questions framed in terms of days will be asked only for a limited time after an event. Further, they expect that questions about a relatively trivial event (a home interview) will be asked only for a limited time after the event. Subjects converge on 60 days as the bound in our case. There are other possible sources of upper bounds that may arise in other cases. For example, people who sell air conditioners may impose an upper bound on reports from memory of the weights of window units because they know that these can be lifted by a single person (e.g., 75 lb). When subjects do impose an upper boundary on reports and there is considerable inexactness in memory, large bias effects will appear. For elapsed time estimates, the effect will consist of a forward bias; for other quantity estimates, the effect will consist of a downward bias. The existence of such imposed boundaries can be inferred from the distribution of reports because larger reported values will be sparse or nonexistent.
Finally, consider the principle of rounding, which led to forward bias in temporal reports. We found overuse of prototypic values in estimation; the fact that the distance between prototypes increased across the range of possible values led to systematic bias in reporting. A parallel situation may arise in any case where subjects are asked to report a recollection of quantity, and the size of the unit used in rounding increases as the quantity to be estimated increases. When unit size increases, the distance between prototypic values will increase; hence, downward bias will be found in estimates of quantity. For example, consider a postal clerk asked for the weight (in ounces) of the various packages he has mailed in a day. The units he uses in this case might be ounces, half pounds (8-oz units), and pounds (16-oz units); the prototypic values would be 8, 16, and 32. If the cut points for reporting prototypic value lie midway between the rounded values, the range for reports of 16 oz will extend up to remembered values of 24 but down only to remembered values of 12. Hence, rounding will lead to a downward bias in reporting. Reports may show an increase in the units of rounding as quantity increases even when the larger categories are not named (like pounds, months, etc.). Consider physician reports of the number of visits by particular patients over the year. The physicians may use raw values up to roughly 5, then round by 5s to roughly 20, and round by 10s past 20. Because the range for reports of 10 visits will extend up to remembered values of 15 but down only to remembered values of 7.5, rounding will lead to downward bias in reporting.
The expected value of reports generated by Response Process Three is
The log-likelihood of the parameters given n reports d\, ..., d n is computed as E(Z 3 | M ,<r,c) = (A7) L(d|c,a,,a 2 ,a 3 ,ft,ft,ft) :
',|c,a,,a2,« 3 ,ft,ft,ft)],
